A Moral Argument Against Miracles by Keller, James A.
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 12 Issue 1 Article 4 
1-1-1995 
A Moral Argument Against Miracles 
James A. Keller 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Keller, James A. (1995) "A Moral Argument Against Miracles," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society 
of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 12 : Iss. 1 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol12/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
A MORAL ARGUMENT AGAINST MIRACLES 
James A. Keller 
Those who believe that miracles (temporary suspensions of some law of nature 
accomplished by divine power) have occurred typically hold that they are rare and 
that only a small percentage of all people have been eyewitnesses to ihem or been 
direct beneficiaries of them. Although a claim that they occur far more frequently 
would be empirically highly implausible, I argue that the claim that God performs 
miracles in such a pattern unavoidably implies that God is gUilty of unfairness. I 
articulate a criterion of fairness, discuss various types of miracles, and defend my 
conclusion against a variety of possible rejoinders. 
In the literature of the philosophy of religion in the Judeo-Christian tradition, 
miracles have generally been understood to be temporary suspensions of one 
or more laws of nature accomplished by divine power. That is, in a miracle, 
God causes the occurrence of some process which, apart from the exercise 
of divine power, would have been impossible in that situation- impossible 
because that occurrence is not within the natural capacities of the creaturely 
entities involved. It is important to note that there is no term in the Old 
Testament or in the New which is equivalent to miracle in this sense.! Thus, 
our concern in this paper is with a concept which originated after biblical 
times, though one whose development was probably stimulated by reflection 
on certain biblical narratives. Hereafter, unless otherwise indicated, the term 
miracle will refer to the post-biblical concept indicated in the first sentence.2 
The question of whether or not miracles in this sense occur or are even 
possible has generated a vast literature, as has the question of whether one 
could ever be justified in believing that a miracle had occurred. However, 
my concern in this paper is not with any of these issues (though I shall at one 
point touch lightly on one of them). Instead, I want to focus on what I shall 
call a moral argument against miracles. It attempts to show that today's 
believers in the actual occurrence of miracles typically must imply that God 
is guilty of a kind of unfairness-a quality which seems morally problematic 
and thus one which, I assume, believers would not want to attribute to God.3 
My argument does not claim that all miracles, no matter when or in what 
pattern they occur, must involve unfairness on God's part; rather, it is an 
argument against a certain complex view of their purpose, location, and 
obviousness, a view which is rather common today among those who hold 
that miracles have occurred. However, because it is difficult to formulate 
another empirically plausible view of the purpose, location, and obviousness 
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of miracles, problems with the view I discuss pose a challenge for anyone 
who believes that miracles have actually occurred. Thus, it is an argument 
for the conclusion that even theists should not claim that God has actually 
worked miracles, lest they imply that God is unfair or be driven to claims 
about the occurrence of miracles which are empirically false or at least im-
plausible. 
The claim that the view of miracles to be discussed implies that God is 
unfair might suggest that my moral argument against miracles is simply 
another aspect of the problem of evil. In a way that suggestion is correct. 
But I believe that the claim that God has performed miracles raises problems 
with which some of today's most popular theodicies seem inadequate to deal. 
For example, many theodicies today treat natural evils as unavoidable results 
of the operation of a system of laws of nature. Humans suffer natural evils 
because of the joint operation of these laws and the choices humans make; 
e.g., a tornado touches down (because of the operation of certain laws of 
nature) on the spot where a person has chosen (for reasons that have nothing 
to do with that tornado) to locate his home, and the person is killed. People 
who advance such theodicies usually are not theological determinists, and 
they would not say that God intended to cause the death of that person while 
sparing his neighbor who lives a block away.4 But those who claim that God 
has miraculously saved someone's life must claim that God intended to save 
precisely that person's life and by not miraculously intervening did not intend 
to save the life of the person who died. Thus, the claim that God has worked 
a miracle implies that God has singled out certain persons for some benefit 
which many others do not receive; this is central to my claim that it implies 
that God is unfair.s The balance of my paper consists of an articulation and 
defense of this claim. 
No event would be categorized as a miracle unless it is unexpected and 
thought to have some good purpose; it would not be categorized as a violation 
of some law of nature unless it were unexpected, and it would not be attrib-
uted to divine agency unless its purpose were believed to be good.6 Among 
events which might be categorized as miracles, I find it helpful to distinguish 
two types, which I shall term obvious miracles and inferred miracles. When 
someone who categorizes an event as a miracle (thinks she) knows enough 
about the processes involved in the event and the relevant accepted laws of 
nature to determine that the former could not happen unless the latter were 
suspended, it is an obvious miracle. For example, if a person understands 
the account in Judges of the sun's standing still in response to Joshua's 
command to involve the Earth's instantaneously ceasing to rotate on its axis 
and that person also accepts the principle of inertia, she could determine that 
the former could not happen unless the latter were suspended. But if the 
categorizer does not have detailed enough information about the processes 
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involved in the event or the relevant laws of nature to determine that the 
event must have involved a suspension of some law of nature, it is an inferred 
miracle. In inferred miracles the categorizer infers that the event involved a 
suspension of some law of nature because the outcome is both unusual in 
comparison to the outcome of many apparently similar situations and better 
than the usual outcome (e.g., a person's recovering from an illness from 
whom few recover or walking away with virtually no injuries from a crash 
at 60 miles per hour). In other words the difference is this: in an obvious 
miracle there is a logical inconsistency between statements describing the 
event and statements describing some accepted laws of nature; however, in 
an inferred miracle one lacks a sufficiently detailed set of statements about 
the event or about relevant accepted laws of nature to yield a logical incon-
sistency, but one infers that there would be an inconsistency if both types of 
statements were sufficiently detailed.7 
It is important to realize that justifying the claim that the latter are miracles 
involves a problem not faced by analogous claims about the former. In 
obvious miracles, there is a direct inconsistency between the belief that some 
process occurred in the world and the acceptance of some law of nature, but 
in inferred miracles that there is an inconsistency between some process and 
some law of nature is inferred on the basis of the unlikeliness of the outcome.S 
Thus, someone who believes that an inferred miracle has occurred is usually 
relying on what might be termed "statistical evidence." The event deemed a 
miracle might be the "miraculous" recovery of someone diagnosed as having 
incurable terminal cancer; sometimes in such cases believers had prayed for 
the life of the individual. Or the event might be the emergence unhurt of a 
person involved in a terrible accident of a sort which is usually instantly fatal. 
In neither case does any human know both the relevant laws of nature and 
the initial conditions well enough to say that such an event violated any laws 
of nature. But both events are sufficiently unusual and unexpected (statisti-
cally unlikely) and sufficiently ic line with what believers think a loving and 
merciful God might do that some believers may call them miracles. And 
some who call them that might mean the term not just in the sense of a 
wonderful and surprising event, but in the strong sense of the temporary 
suspension of a law of nature accomplished by the power of God. 
Just as part of the reason for thinking that an event is an inferred miracle 
typically depends on comparing it with similar events, so does the reason for 
my charge that attributing this sort of miracle to God implies that God is 
unfair. The basis for my objection to this sort of miracle is the total absence 
of any pattern in the alleged miracles. For example, of all the people with 
what doctors believe to be terminal cancer, some "miraculously" (i.e., unex-
pectedly) recover; most do not. Those who recover are not confined to be-
lievers, nor even to believers and those who will eventually become believers. 
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Nor are those who recover confined to people for whom prayers were offered; 
nor does everyone for whom prayers were offered recover. Nor is there any 
other discernible pattern among those who recover, and certainly not any 
discernible pattern related to what believers hold to be important to God. 
Moreover, the problem is not merely the lack of any discernible overall 
pattern. More specifically, there may be two cases which are similar in all 
ways that seem relevant, yet in one case there will be a recovery (which some 
deem a miracle) and in the other case no recovery. The same is true for other 
allegedly miraculous events (of the inferred type): they fit no discernible 
pattern, and apparently similar cases have different outcomes. Several be-
lievers pray for highly unlikely outcomes; some receive what they prayed for 
in ways that seem sufficiently strange and unexpected that some people will 
claim that the outcome involved a miracle, but others do not receive what 
they prayed for. 
My objection is based on this lack of any discernible pattern and the fact 
of different outcomes in similar cases, both of which suggest the unfairness 
of what God is alleged to have done. We should note that these two factors 
also suggest another possibility: that what are taken to be miracles are not, 
that instead they are the result of the operation of creaturely factors as yet 
not known or understood. Here the believer in miracles faces a dilemma. Ex 
hypothesi, he is speaking of events which are not clearly impossible in light 
of accepted laws of nature; rather, his reasons for regarding them as miracles 
are their unusualness and their conformity to what he takes to be divine 
purposes. But believers typically do not categorize all such events as mir-
acles. Why not? Not doing so seems arbitrary and unjustified on their part. 
Note that my point is not the claim that God would be arbitrary to perform 
miracles in this fashion but that the believer is being arbitrary in identifying 
only a proper subset of events of this type as miracles. Note too that my 
point is not that raised with such force by Hume: the qualities used to identify 
the alleged miracle are not sufficient to justify the conclusion that the event 
truly involved a suspension of a law of nature (rather than an error on the 
observer's part or a mistaken belief about what the laws of nature are). 
Instead it is that even if these qualities are adequate to identify miracles, it 
is arbitrary to call only some events possessing these qualities miracles. 
However, the only way for a person to avoid this arbitrariness about which 
events are miracles and which are not is to say that all events with these 
features are miracles-e.g., all events in which a patient recovers after doc-
tors had said that the situation is hopeless. Few believers in miracles have 
made a claim like this, but it is arbitrary to claim a miracle in relation to any 
proper subset of such events. 
This difficulty would not arise in connection with events which are what I 
termed obvious miracles. Presumably any event which was believed to in-
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volve a clear-cut inconsistency with some accepted law of nature and have 
an outcome of the sort believed to be consistent with God's purposes would 
be called a miracle by those believe that miracles occur. But believers are 
not inclined to label as miracles all events which meet the criteria on the basis 
of which they label some events miracles of what I termed the inferred type. 
Thus they seem to be guilty of arbitrariness in their own judgments. 
Miracles as Involving Unfairness by God 
Moreover, even if they eliminate this arbitrariness by identifying as mir-
acles all the events which meet their precise criteria (whatever those be), the 
resulting view would still imply that God is guilty of unfairness. So too 
would a view which identifies as miracles all events which involve an appar-
ent inconsistency between what is believed to have occurred and accepted 
laws of nature. In what sense do these views imply that God is unfair? They 
do so in the sense that they imply that God takes the initiative in doing for 
one person something qualitatively different from what God does for others 
in a similar condition. The phrase takes the initiative is intended to exclude 
God's acting in response to a person's doing something to which God had a 
policy of acting in a certain way. For example, suppose that God had promised 
to perform a requested miracle for anyone who included in the request the 
words "God, please do this miracle for me" (or their equivalent in other 
languages). Then if God performed the requested miracle in response to some 
person's properly phrased request, God would not be "taking the initiative.,,9 
But if God chose someone for no reason at all and performed a miracle for 
that person, God would be taking the initiative. I assume that performing a 
miracle is qualitatively different from God's doing something which does not 
involve the temporary suspension of some law of nature. In light of the 
explanation of takes the initiative, the phrase about others in a similar con-
dition may be redundant, but it serves as a reminder that the charge of 
unfairness is not leveled simply when it is alleged that God does something 
for one person that God does not do for another; the two people must be 
similar in respect to the quality which is the reason for the divine action. If 
there is no such quality, then it is unfair because God is arbitrarily (ex hy-
pothesi, there is no reason) bestowing a benefit on one person which God 
does not bestow on another. 
To this account of unfairness, at least two rejoinders might be offered. It 
might be claimed that God has reasons for selecting some people and not 
others; we shall explore that possibility later in the paper. The other rejoinder 
is that even if God does confer benefits on some people and not on others, 
this would not be unfair because God is not under any obligation to give 
humans something.] 0 I think the alleged reason is questionable. Although 
God was under no obligation to create us, God's own nature might preclude 
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God's treating us in certain ways once we had been created; for example, it 
would seem to deeply violate any concept of divine goodness if God were to 
create us or any sentient creatures with the intention that they should expe-
rience nothing but great suffering for their entire existence. But even if this 
consideration is not decisive, the Christian has an even stronger reason to 
resist implying that God treats people in such a way as to confer benefits on 
some and not on similar others. Christians assert that God loves humans; and 
if two similar people are in similar situations, it is not loving to treat them 
differently. So if it seems inappropriate to some Christians to apply concepts 
like fair and unfair to God, they may instead think of what is loving and 
unloving. 
But this claim that it is not loving to treat similar people differently may 
be challenged: I may love both my children equally, yet give them different 
but equal goods. Yes, but this would be treating them similarly, for the goods 
are equal. I am assuming that the goods which believers have seen as con-
ferred in a miracle on one person are typically not matched by an equal good 
conferred on another who is not the recipient of a miraculous benefit. (This 
assumption will be defended later when we consider the kinds of goods 
thought to be conferred in miracles.) If the two people are in other ways 
similar, then giving one and not the other a miraculous benefit is not treating 
them similarly. Another challenge might be that I would not be unfair to give 
a gift to one person I love and not to another whom I love equally. Perhaps 
not, provided what is given is a gift and not something needed. (But even in 
this case, how will one child feel if a parent gives a gift to a sibling and not 
to the first child even though there is no reason in the situation for the 
distinction-i.e., it was not either's birthday, neither had suffered any hurt, 
etc.?) However, when what is given is needed (e.g., restoration to health or 
even the knowledge of God) and when it lies within the resources of the giver 
to give what is needed to both people he loves, then it does seem to me unfair 
( I ·) .. I 11 or un ovmg to give It to on y one. 
According to the argument thus far, it is unfair for God to perform miracles 
for some people and not for others, because in so doing God takes the initia-
tive in conferring benefits upon some people involved in the mi.racle which 
others do not obtain. We have two remaining possible responses to this argu-
ment to be considered: (1) God has reasons for performing miracles for some 
people and not others, reasons adequate to undermine the charge of unfair-
ness, and (2) there are no benefits given to some which are not given to others. 
To deal with these objections, we need to consider with greater specificity 
the goods which God allegedly confers in miracles. 
In the Christian tradition two kinds of goods have been mentioned. One 
has to do with enhancing the recipient's knowledge of God or faith in God; 
the other has to with various temporal goods, such as life, health, and other 
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goods which are needed or desired (financial help, offspring, etc.). I shall 
term a miracle which provides the first sort of good an epistemic miracle, 
and one which provides the second sort of good a practical miracle. Of 
course, a miracle could provide both sorts of goods; for example, a healing 
miracle performed by Jesus would be a practical miracle and could also 
highlight Jesus' role as a revealer of God and thus be an epistemic miracle. 
Most Christian theologians and philosophers have stressed the epistemic 
function of miracles. They have held that miracles are intended to certify, to 
confirm, or in some way to reinforce or call attention to some divine revela-
tion in order to increase the likelihood that the events (or the message 12) be 
accepted as revelationY Though this view of the purpose of miracles is 
common in the post-biblical Christian tradition, it is not at all clear that most 
of the events in the Bible which the later tradition took to be miracles have 
exactly this purpose. Some clearly do-e.g., some demonstrations by Moses 
in his conflict with the Egyptian magicians (Ex. 7:8-13); Gideon's use of a 
fleece (Judges 6:36-40); Elijah's contest with the prophets of Baal (I Kings 
18:20-40); Jesus' healing of the paralytic (Mk: 2: 10-12); and the claim that 
Jesus was attested by God "with mighty works and wonders and signs" (Acts 
2:22). Most of the other events later seen as miracles do not seem intended 
to confirm the revelatory status of some different event or some person or 
some message. Instead, they are themselves revelatory of God (perhaps more 
specifically of God's power, concern, intentions, etc.). But if they are them-
selves revelatory rather than confirming something else as revelation, I would 
still classify them as having an epistemic purpose. 
Theologians and philosophers have been most concerned with the epistemic 
benefits of miracles, but popular piety has been at least as concerned with 
practical miracles. Believers tell stories of healings (those at Lourdes are 
famous examples) and of other sorts of non-epistemic benefits conferred 
through miracles. 
Could there be other purposes of miracles? I know of no way to rule out 
the possibility of there being other purposes, but there are problems with 
articulating this possibility. The purposes I suggested are those which have 
been advanced by believers in the occurrence of miracles who have reflected 
on them over the centuries. Alternative suggestions would have a burden of 
proof to show their congruity with some religious tradition. Moreover, the 
two purposes I have discussed encompass the primary purposes which be-
lievers think God has in actions toward humans: to bring them to a knowl-
edge of and faith in God (the epistemic purpose) and to graciously restore 
them to wholeness. 
Nor would it be a useful strategy for a believer in miracles to suggest that 
their purpose is unknown (or unknowable) by humans or that they have no 
purpose. For this would make miracles impossible in principle to identify. 
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For a miracle is not just an event which seems impossible given known laws 
of nature; it is an event of this sort brought about by divine power. But how 
can we recognize that the power is divine without identifying the purpose of 
the event and linking it to what we believe to be the sort of purposes God 
has? For we can identify a nonbodied agent like God only by the purposes 
we see manifested in God's activity. So we cannot be ignorant of the purpose 
of an event and rationally attribute it to divine agency.14 Therefore, those 
who believe that miracles have occurred would seem well advised to claim 
that they were performed for an epistemic or practical purpose or both. 
Epistemic Miracles 
According to the view of miracles being discussed, epistemic miracles are 
concentrated in, or perhaps even confined exclusively to, periods of time 
which might be called revelatory periods. In Christianity such periods were, 
e.g., the times of the Exodus, of the Old Testament prophets, and of Jesus 
and the beginnings of the church. In times other than these, epistemic mir-
acles are believed to occur either not at all or rarely. IS 
Before examining this view in detail, it is important to recognize that there 
are strong reasons for a believer in the actual occurrence of miracles with 
this primary purpose to hold a view like this of their temporal location. For 
many Christians and most non-Christians would say that they had never 
observed any miracles. Of course, those who do not believe that there exists 
a God who can work miracles would certainly say they had never observed 
any; but such people typically do not even admit that they have observed any 
events which seem impossible to explain in light of accepted laws of nature 
(which we might call candidate events).16 Therefore, today either miracles 
do not occur at all, or they occur in such a way that many people do not 
believe that they or even candidate events occur. But there would be no point 
to a miracle with an epistemic purpose which was not such as to be thought 
a miracle (or at least a candidate event) by virtually all observers. 17 Thus, 
claiming that miracles with this purpose are confined to (or at least concen-
trated in) revelatory periods not including the present is an understandable 
strategy to explain the paucity of such miracles today. 
Moreover, we must exercise care in evaluating the claims of those who say 
that they have observed such miracles. We must first be sure that they are 
using miracle in the sense of this paper. For as we noted earlier, sometimes 
people will apply the term miracle to an event simply because it is unexpected 
and constitutes or accomplishes some important good, without any serious 
consideration of whether the event involves the suspension of accepted laws 
of nature (as opposed, say, to involving processes for which we have not 
established specific enough laws of nature to determine whether the processes 
require suspensions of any of them). Many such events would not be obvious 
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miracles and might not be miracles at all in the sense that term has in this 
paper. 
However, if after this clarification there remain some who would claim that 
obvious miracles with an epistemic purpose occur today, that would not 
constitute a serious problem for my argument. For my objection to the claim 
that epistemic miracles occur is that God's performing epistemic miracles for 
some people and not for others would involve unfairness on God's part. So 
even if God does perform obvious epistemic miracles for some people today, 
the large number of people for whom no obvious miracles (or candidate 
events) are performed would still constitute an adequate ground for my ob-
. . 18 Jectlon. 
The problem with this understanding of the purpose and location of 
epistemic miracles is that it implies that the eyewitnesses of the miracles had 
a decided advantage which many other people did not have. For they would 
have experienced an event designed to enhance the development of faith in 
them but others would not have. If it would have been unreasonable to expect 
them to believe that certain events were revelatory without the confirmation 
provided by an obvious miracle, it is unreasonable to expect other people to 
believe that the events were revelatory unless they see miracles confirming 
the revelatory status of those events or have grounds as strong as the eyewit-
nesses had to believe that the miraculous events occurred as described. A 
similar conclusion follows if the miraculous events are held to be revelatory 
rather than to be confirmation of the revelatory status of something else: if 
it would not be reasonable to expect eyewitnesses to believe that certain 
events were revelations of God unless they involved an obvious miracle, then 
it would not be reasonable to expect non-eyewitnesses to believe that they 
were revelations of God unless they had grounds as strong as the eyewitnesses 
to believe that the miraculous events occurred as described. In order for 
others to have equally strong grounds, either they would have to see events 
which are as clearly miraculous and which confirm a message endorsing the 
earlier events,19 or they would have to have extremely well documented 
eyewitness accounts of the events which the eyewitnesses saw.20 For God 
to fail to provide other people with such grounds is for God to treat those 
people unfairly: God gave the eyewitnesses an epistemic advantage denied 
to other (potential) believers. 
To the claim that performing epistemic miracles for some people and not 
for others is unfair, it might be objected that not every giving of an epistemic 
advantage entails unfairness. I may teB a secret to one person and not to 
another wi thout being unfair to the other. True, but not if (1) the secret 
concerns a matter about which the people have an equal, very great need for 
the information and (2) there are no grounds for me to treat the first differ-
ently from the second, particularly if I claim to love them both. And Chris-
A MORAL ARGUMENT AGAINST MIRACLES 63 
tians typically hold that what was revealed in (or confirmed by) epistemic 
miracles is very important for a person's knowledge of God and faith relation 
to God, which are matters of the greatest import for everyone. But, an 
objector might continue, even if both people do desperately need the infor-
mation, telling something to one person and not to another need not entail 
unfairness if I know that the second person will soon come to believe or at 
least hear what I told the first without my telling her. True again, but we are 
speaking of matters which many people never even hear about. Moreover, 
the objector's suggestion overlooks something crucial: the difference under 
discussion is not just between those who are told something and those who 
are not; it is between those who are told something accompanied by a miracle 
and those who, if they hear it at all, do not receive an accompanying miracle 
or equivalently clear divine confirmation. Perhaps an important reason why 
many hear without believing is that they do not have the clear confirmation 
given by epistemic miracles; in any event, if the religious message to some 
people is accompanied by obvious miracles and to others it is not, the latter 
have been placed at a disadvantage. Thus, none of the objections considered 
in this paragraph provides a way to save God from the charge of unfairness 
in giving certain people an epistemic advantage. 
My response in the previous paragraph assumes that what is cDnfirmed in 
an epistemic miracle is information which everyone needs equally-e.g., 
information on such matters as what one must do to be saved or to be rightly 
related to God. This is what traditionally has been said to be confirmed.21 
But an objector might try to undercut the charge of unfairness against God 
by claiming that not everyone needs equally the information conveyed in 
epistemic miracles. For example, one might claim that people experience 
epistemic miracles because God wishes them to do special tasks. The infor-
mation might be that God wishes them to do the task. Here a classic example 
would be the fleece of Gideon; the account in Judges 6:36-40 might well be 
interpreted as indicating that God performed two miracles to confirm for 
Gideon that God wanted him to lead the army of Israel against "its enemies. 
Or it may be generally available information which is specially confirmed 
because God wishes the person to do some extraordinarily difficult task; 
perhaps the first disciples were permitted to see the risen Jesus because they 
were to be the first leaders of the church. 
This response does offer promise of undercutting the charge of unfairness 
by providing a reason why God works epistemic miracles for the direct 
benefit of only some people. But it faces at least two serious difficulties: 
(1) the information confirmed by what are traditionally thought to be central 
epistemic miracles (e.g., those done by Jesus to confirm his status) has tra-
ditionally not been held to be generally available nor discoverable without 
special revelation and (2) many of what seem to be epistemic miracles do not 
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seem to fit this pattern. For example, Elijah's victory over the priests of Baal 
(I Kings 18:20-40)-one of the most dramatic epistemic miracles in the 
Bible-was done for the benefit of ordinary Israelites, of whom there is no 
reason to think that a special task was required. Some of the miracles done 
by Jesus, which have traditionally been seen as having revelatory (epistemic) 
purposes, were done to and in the presence of people of whom no special 
task was required. 22 The presence of these two difficulties shows that this 
response will require significant work if it is to have any hope of providing 
a defense of the fairness of God in relation to what have been traditionally 
regarded as epistemic miracles. 
Another sort of difficulty for this proposal is created by the fact that many 
believers who faced tasks of great difficulty were not granted any confirma-
tion through epistemic miracles-or at least they never claimed to have wit-
nessed any. This difficulty does not provide a counterexample to the thesis, 
for the thesis at most claims that all epistemic miracles were done for those 
who had some extraordinary task, not the converse. But it does raise the 
issue of fairness in another way: is it fair that God grant a confirmatory 
miracle to some on whom an extraordinarily difficult task is laid and not to 
others? Nor can it be said that God knew that a confirmatory miracle would 
not be needed in all those cases in which none was given, for not all believers 
faced with tasks of great difficulty actually undertake them. 
Sometimes it is said that though later (potential) believers lack the advan-
tage of experiencing epistemic miracles, they have a different, compensating 
advantage: they have seen the spread of the Church. The spread of the 
Church is alleged to be confirmation of the truth of its proclamation. But it 
would provide no confirmation for potential believers at times and places 
when the Church is not known to have spread-e.g., during the second cen-
tury and in those mission fields where the potential believers are not ac-
quainted with facts about the growth of the Church. Thus, in relation to these 
potential believers even if not in relation to us, the growth of the Church 
would not provide an alternative to miracles as grounds to consider the 
Christian proclamation true. Moreover, there are other religious groups 
which have also spread widely and which have considerably different views 
from those of Christians. Thus this alleged advantage affords the potential 
believer no grounds for becoming a Christian rather than an adherent of one 
of these other religions. 
Moreover, sociologists and psychologists can provide a wide variety of 
other reasons for the growth of various religious groups including the Chris-
tian community. These reasons involve such things as the power of deeply 
held beliefs to influence one's own behavior and the beliefs of others, tribal 
and national loyalties, financial considerations, the example of esteemed 
others, etc. I do not know of any way to show that such reasons do not (nor 
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that they do) completely explain the growth of the Christian community. But 
such reasons do provide grounds to doubt the claim that the growth of the 
Church provides rational confirmation of the truth of its proclamation, and 
they probably make it not irrational to believe that the growth of the Church 
can be explained without assuming the truth of its doctrines. Thus, I conclude 
that if the purpose of miracles is to provide rational grounds for believing 
that revelation occurred, then God treated the eyewitnesses to these miracles 
in a specially favored way which is not duplicated or equalled for later 
potential believers. 
But perhaps it is wrong to construe the purpose of miracles as being the 
provision of rational grounds to believe that a revelation occurred; it might 
be claimed that the intended force of miracles is emotional or psychological 
rather than rational. 23 That is, perhaps miracles occurred not- in order to 
rationally certify the revelation, but in order to provide a powerful, though 
ultimately non-rational, inducement to accept something as revelation. This 
alternative, however, fares no better than the previous one. If God could not 
expect many (any?) eyewitnesses of a prophet or Jesus to accept the revela-
tion without the motivation provided by a miracle, then why should God 
expect anyone today to do so without similar motivation? Again, the sug-
gestion that the success of the Christian community provides an alternative 
motivation fails for the same reasons as it failed earlier in relation to the 
thesis that miracles were intended to provide rational confirmation for the 
revelation. 
We should not be surprised that the problems with saying that miracles are 
intended to provide rational grounds for accepting a revelation also occur 
when it is said that miracles are intended to provide a psychologiCal, but 
non-rational, inducement to accept the revelation. For those problems had 
to do not with the adequacy of miracles as rational grounds (or as emotional 
inducement), but with what I claimed was the unfairness of God's providing 
some people and not other people with these grounds. Thus, the problems 
would hold no matter how miracles are said to promote acceptance of the 
revelation. 
It might, however, seem that there is a way miracles could playa role in 
bringing people to accept the revelation without being liable to this criticism. 
Suppose that miracles during revelatory periods are intended to motivate not 
the acceptance of the revelation but only its serious consideration. Once 
again, it might seem legitimate to raise the same objection: why should God 
expect us today to seriously consider something when God would not expect 
contemporaries of the event to seriously consider it without a miracle? But 
if miracles are intended to motivate only the serious consideration of the 
revelation, then the growth of the Church might provide something of an 
alternative. As long as there are not too many successful religious commu-
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nities, that a particular community is known to have been successful might 
provide some reason for seriously considering what it proclaims, along with 
what is proclaimed by other communities known to have been successful. But 
this alternative would still face the problem of there being some potential 
believers for whom this could not be expected to provide a motivation-viz., 
those who do not know about the success of the Church; and even for those 
who know of the Church's growth, the motivating power of that knowledge 
could still be legitimately weakened by knowledge of sociological and psy-
chological factors which contributed to the growth of the Church; Moreover, 
if the growth of the Church is to replace miracles as something which moti-
vates a person to seriously consider Christian claims about revelation (or if 
that growth is itself a miracle which is intended to do this), then the splin-
tering of the Christian community into different groups with different views 
about the alleged revelation will confuse the person about exactly what is to 
be seriously considered. 
There are other problems with any view which makes the purpose of 
epistemic miracles to be the provision of anything less than rational grounds 
for accepting the revelation. If their purpose is to provide emotional induce-
ment to accept the revelation, then God is tricking or conning people into 
belief. Of course, the belief is (on this view) true, but people are nevertheless 
being brought to believe in a way which we would ordinarily condemn or at 
least question. While some thinkers (e.g., William James) might contend that 
the use of emotional inducements is legitimate on matters on which adequate 
rational evidence cannot be obtained, ex hypothesi this is not true in the 
present case. For the view under discussion assumes that obvious miracles 
have occurred. And if they have occurred, there is no reason why they could 
not provide rational grounds and not merely emotional inducement. The 
variation that takes the purpose of miracles to be to motivate the serious 
consideration of the revelation faces the additional problem that once one has 
given the revelation serious consideration, one still must decide on some other 
grounds whether or not to accept it. Since ex hypothesi the miracle is not 
these other grounds, they must be available even without the miracle. 
Indeed, if miracles do not provide rational grounds for accepting a revela-
tion, then if there are any rational grounds, they must be something other 
than the miracles. Presumably the grounds would be something like the 
inherent plausibility of what is proclaimed or its plausibility in light of certain 
other factors. 24 But whatever they are, they are available without the miracles. 
Thus, I conclude that if miracles are intended to play any role in rationally 
grounding faith or in inducing one either to have faith or to give Christianity 
serious consideration, then potential believers who observed the miracles are 
in a favored position in relation to other potential believers. Therefore, I hold 
that God has treated some people unfairly unless for all people (1) God causes 
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events whose status as miracles is equally clear or (2) God gives grounds 
for believing that the miracles occurred which are as strong as those possessed 
by the original eyewitnesses. I take it that there is universal agreement that 
condition (l) is not met; and I also take it that later belicvers do not havc 
grounds to believe that miracles have occurred which are as strong as those 
of the eyewitnesses. While there is disagreement about how strong the evi-
dence provided by the Bible is, no one would contend that it is as strong as 
that which the eyewitnesses had. 
Perhaps it will be objected that no evidence about the occurrence of an 
event could be as strong as that provided by eyewitness observation, so God 
could not possibly provide later potential believers with evidence as strong 
as that provided to eyewitnesses. But this will not save God from the charge 
of unfairness, for if it is so, then God could have continued to perform 
miracles. If God did not do so, at least CJod could have made the documentary 
evidence regarding the occurrence of the event strong enough that obvious 
historiographical objections would be precluded. For example, God could 
have caused there to be eyewitness accounts written immediately after the 
alleged events, perhaps even accounts by hostile witnesses, such as Pharaoh 
for the events in Moses' time and the Jewish leaders for events in Jesus' time. 
If God caused miracles for the sake of potential believers at the time of the 
revelations, then God could and should have done more for later potential 
believers. If God did not do more, then God does seem guilty of unfairness. 
This concludes my discussion of the theory that God performs epistemic 
miracles for only certain people. I have argued that this theory puts the 
eyewitnesses of the miracles in a greatly favored position. Note that I have 
not argued that it is unfair for God to make certain events revelatory even 
though only certain people can directly experience those events.' Rather, my 
argument is that (1) accompanying these events with obvious, often dramatic 
miracles (or having such miracles as constituents of revelatory events) for 
the purpose of rationally certifying them or inducing faith or inducing con-
sideration of them puts the eyewitnesses in a specially favored position, (2) 
putting people in such a position is unfair unless God performs equally clear 
miracles for later potential believers or gives them something of equal evi-
dential or motivational value, and (3) God has done neither. 
Before ending this section, however, perhaps I should expand on my claim 
that I have not argued that it is unfair for God to make certain events reve-
latory even though only certain people can experience them. Though I have 
not argued for this thesis, it might seem difficult for me to avoid holding it 
as well as my thesis about miracles. But whether or not I can avoid it depends 
on God's role in the revelatory events. So that they do not fall under the 
strictures of my thesis about miracles, we shall have to assume that the 
revelatory events neither are themselves miracles nor are confirmed by mir-
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acles. Then their occurrence is the result of natural processes, yet ex hy-
pothesi they also manifest God. Why? If our theory is that God's being 
manifested depends on an additional divine activity of some sort in relation 
to this event which God does not exercise in relation to other qualitatively 
similar events, then this understanding would seem to imply that God is 
unfair. On the other hand, suppose our theory is that whenever events have 
certain properties, God is manifest in them. This theory would not involve 
God's being unfair, for it would not involve God's taking the initiative to 
treat some people differently from others who are qualitatively similar. 
But it might be objected that even this latter theory suggests a kind of 
unfairness, for not everyone has heard about these revelatory events, so some 
people are specially privileged. But the fact that some people have not heard 
about these revelatory events would show that God is unfair only if the fact 
that some people had heard and others had not heard depended on some divine 
initiative in which God treats qualitatively similar people differently, and 
there is no reason to think that there has been such an initiative. That some 
people have access to these revelatory events and others do not is the result 
of the normal operation of creaturely processes. Nevertheless, it might be 
objected, some people have access to saving divine revelation and others do 
not. This situation may not be the result of unfairness in the sense defined 
in this paper, but it still does not seem right in some important sense. I 
sympathize with the sentiment underlying this objection. But it seems not 
right only if others do not have access to some saving divine revelation, not 
necessarily the one recognized by Christians. Whether or not they do is 
disputed, and we cannot pursue the issue here. But enough has been said to 
distinguish my thesis about miracles from the issue raised by the claim that 
revelation is given in historical events. 
Practical Miracles 
Practical miracles is my term for miracles which are intended to confer some 
benefit not directly related to the knowledge of God or faith in God. The 
benefit could be, e.g., healing, preserving lives, or meeting other human needs 
and desires. Since these need not have any epistemic purpose, their being 
miracles need not be obvious to anyone. However, as with epistemic mir-
acles, the claim that God performs such miracles implies that God is unfair, 
for God is taking the initiative in conferring benefits on some people which 
God does not confer on other similar people in similar circumstances. Now 
we need to deal with two possible lines of response to this problem with 
claiming that God performs practical miracles. 
The first response is that there is no unfairness because there are no benefits 
given in miracles to one person which are not given to others. Taken at face 
value this claim seems just plain false. As we noted earlier, for everyone on 
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whom it is claimed that God bestowed benefits through a miracle, there are 
apparently similar people in similar situations on whom no similar benefit is 
bestowed, either in a miracle or in the ordinary course of events. Not eve-
ryone who is terminally ill unexpectedly recovers, not everyone who is hun-
gry receives food (or the means to obtain food), etc. 
So perhaps it will be claimed not that similar benefits are given, but that 
appropriate benefits are given. One terminally ill person is miraculously 
healed; another very similar person is not because God knows that she would 
suffer even more or she would become wicked if she were healed. Thus God 
is doing for each what is most beneficial for each. Because this response 
makes claims about humanly unknowable hypotheticals, I do not think there 
is any way to conclusively disprove it, but certain considerations make it 
extremely implausible. We know of too many cases in which human lives 
are shattered by some natural or moral evil to think it likely that the most 
loving thing for God to do in most situations of this sort is to let the creaturely 
world run its course in these cases without divine intervention.25 For exam-
ple, a baby suffers from some disease which leaves it a near vegetable or 
suffers from some abuse which leaves it severely brain-damaged and physi-
cally crippled. Such tragedies may well leave the baby without the capacity 
ever to develop a genuinely human spirituality. And it surely is not true that 
in all such cases the child develops in some way which is more wonderful 
than any of the ways the child would likely have developed if it had not 
suffered from the disease or abuse; nor is it always (or even nearly always) 
the case that humans around the abused child respond in loving ways and 
grow spiritually to a degree unlikely without the tragedy. Sometimes such 
things happen, but far from always. 
Nor is it plausible to say that God allows the tragedy to happen to the child 
because God knows that otherwise the child will grow up and do great evil. 
If this were the reason for God to allow the tragedy, then why did God not 
allow or cause some similar tragedy to happen to people who did in fact grow 
up and do great evil-e.g., to people like Hitler? I believe that any proposed 
justification for God's not intervening miraculously will similarly fall prey 
to the objection that it opens God to the charge of unfairness, of treating 
relevantly similar cases dissimilarly. 
The appearance of unfairness is only strengthened if God sometimes inter-
venes miraculously in response to prayer, as some people believe. Again, the 
problem is that God sometimes does so and sometimes does not do so in 
situations which are apparently similar. That these are situations involving 
a request by one whom God loves only compounds the problem, for it is not 
loving to refuse the reasonable requests of someone whom one loves. But 
what if the requests are not reasonable? Then God should not have granted 
the requests in other similar situations. If the cases are similar, it is hard to 
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see that one request is reasonable and another is not. Thus, belief that mir-
acles occur in this way involves attributing an unfairness to God's activities, 
which is inconsistent with the claim that God loves humans. 
At this point the second line of response might be advanced: it might be 
claimed that cases which appear similar to us might not be similar. Two 
people might utter the same words in a prayer, but one mean them and the 
other not. And two outcomes might not appear similar to us but might be 
similar in their significance in the lives of those in whom they occur. I freely 
grant that we may sometimes be in error in our judgments about similarities. 
The question is whether it is likely that we are wrong about similarities as 
often as it appears that similar prayers are responded to in very dissimilar 
ways. Moreover, recovering and not recovering from an illness appear so 
dissimilar that the lives and personalities of the people involved would have 
to be very different for these outcomes to be no less similar. So I find it very 
implausible to think that we are often wrong in our judgments about similari-
ties on these matters. 
Suppose, however, it is suggested not that we are usually wrong in our 
judgments of similarities which we can discern, but that there is some other 
underlying consistency which we do not discern but which some day (say, in 
heaven) we will understand. We have no evidence that there is such an 
underlying consistency, though I know of no way to give a conclusive proof 
that there is not. But there is a moral argument against this suggestion too. 
For it would seriously handicap believers if God were to leave them ignorant 
of the principles of God's actions in matters which so deeply affect both them 
and others in the world in which they are to embody God's will. If there is 
some kind of a situation in which God will do something miraculous, then 
for believers not to know this makes it impossible for them to act appropri-
ately in this situation. Thus God should inform them, and clearly God has 
not done so. (The postulated underlying consistency is ex hypothesi one of 
whose basis we are ignorant.) But perhaps God does not inform us of the 
reason because it is too complex for us to understand. We shall consider this 
possibility in the final section of the paper. 
Miracles and Religious Ambiguity 
There is one other line of defense which might be offered by those who claim 
that God has performed some miracles, either epistemic or practical. A per-
son might argue that only in what John Hick has termed a "religiously am-
biguous" context can people choose freely whether or not to serve God. In 
such a context suffering must be more or less randomly distributed; in a world 
in which certain human qualities were regularly connected with miraculous 
divine interventions, many people would be motivated to turn to God by 
desire for those benefits rather than by genuine love for God. 26 Because 
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people's freely turning to God out of love is an overriding value, providing 
the context needed to make this possible is also of great value. Since the 
existence of a regular connection between certain creaturely qualities and 
miraculous divine actions would be inconsistent with that value, God should 
not provide it. Therefore, either miracles must occur in what seems to be a 
random fashion, or they should not occur at all. And perhaps there are good 
reasons for God to perform some miracles. 
I will grant, for the sake of argument, the claim about the sort of context 
required for a free human response to God. But why should God perform 
any miracles at all? Many people do come to faith apart from miracles, and 
many people (at least seem to) go through life without any direct benefit from 
practical miracles. Why should God perform miracles for anyone? We have 
looked at the reasons which have been proposed and found them inadequate. 
To suggest that God might have good reasons which we do not know is an 
appeal to our possible ignorance; it can never be decisively refuted, but 
several p"Oints in this paper make it implausible. First, if the context of 
religious ambiguity is to be maintained, any miracles God performs cannot 
be obvious ones. If a defender of miracles has appealed to religious ambiguity 
as necessary to achieving a good of overriding value, he would be guilty of 
a serious inconsistency if he affirmed that God performed obvious miracles 
for anyone.27 Yet some who make this appeal do believe that narratives in 
the Bible accurately describe obvious miracles performed by God. For ex-
ample, if accepted in all their details, the narratives of Elijah's dramatic 
confrontation with the high priests of Baal and of the resurrection appear-
ances of Jesus would be obvious miracles which destroy religious ambiguity. 
Defenders of the importance of a religiously ambiguous context should be 
concerned about such accounts, particularly the latter.28 Stress on the impor-
tance of religious ambiguity does not imply that there cannot be any events 
which manifest God, but it does imply that their manifesting God cannot be 
the consequence of an obvious divine involvement; it must be discernible 
only to the eye of faith. 
What about inferred miracles? These are not obvious miracles, so they 
would not necessarily destroy the religious ambiguity of the context. But 
why should God miraculously intervene? If two people are in qualitatively 
similar situations, there would be no relevant difference in their situations on 
the basis of which God might decide to miraculously benefit one rather than 
the other. If we say that there might be differences unknown to us on which 
God bases the decision, we must ask whether or not these differences involve 
matters generally thought to be of concern to God (e.g., the moral qualities 
of the persons, or their potentialities for contributing positively to their com-
munities). If they do, then it seems empirically unlikely that God bases 
decisions about miraculous help on such qualities; as we have noted earlier, 
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people who are qualitatively similar in ways we think important to God do 
not regularly have similar unlikely things happen to them. Indeed, if similar 
unlikely things happened to them, our situation would not be religiously 
ambiguous. On the other hand, if the differences do not involve matters 
generally thought to be of concern to God, then either God is helping people 
because they have qualities which God does not particularly value (which is 
a rather strange activity to be attributed to God) or God values qualities in 
humans which God has not told us about. This last possibility is also some-
what strange. It suggests that in addition to the qualities God has told us to 
develop, there are other valued qualities God has not told us about. But why 
should God keep us in ignorance if these qualities are important to God? 
Perhaps it might be objected that my line of argument in the previous 
paragraph assumes that people's possessing certain qualities is a sufficient 
condition for God to help them. Instead, it might be claimed that people's 
possessing certain qualities provides a reason for God to help some people, 
but God does not help all with such qualities (perhaps to help preserve 
religious ambiguity). But then the decision about whom to help among those 
who possess that quality is arbitrary. For either there are sufficient reasonsg 
or the decision about whom to help among the group in question is arbitrary.2 
Perhaps it will be replied that God arbitrarily chooses some people to help 
in order to provide a revelatory foretaste of the future overcoming of the evils 
which afflict people. But this suggestion attributes to God the motive not of 
helping the particular people aided but of using the help to reveal God. 
However, we have already seen that on the assumption of the importance of 
religious ambiguity, this revelation cannot involve obvious miracles but in-
stead must be discernible only to the eye of faith. But the eye of faith can 
discern God even in non-miraculous creaturely events. So God's helping 
people by non-obvious miracles seems unnecessary; it involves arbitrarily 
choosing people to receive a miraculous benefit which is not necessary for 
any known purpose of God. And this does seem to meet my criteria for 
unfairness without proposing any compensating value. 
Perhaps the problem with understanding the basis on which God decides 
whom to help is not that the properties themselves are too complex for us to 
grasp, but rather that the connection between the miraculous event and the 
occurrence of the later event with the desired properties is too complex for 
us to see. For example, perhaps God miraculously helped someone fifty years 
ago so that there would occur some recognizable good today; we today mat; 
see the good, but we do not see the connection between the two events? 
Since this proposal appeals to unknown connections, I know of no decisive 
counterargument, but I can explain why I find it implausible. Christians 
generally believe that (one of) God's most important goal(s) for humans is 
that they respond in faith to God, and it seems implausible to think that any 
particular miracle or indeed all miracles together are necessary to make such 
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a response possible. They certainly are not needed as an evidential basis for 
faith, for people come to faith without this basis.3! Nor does it seem plausible 
to think that they are needed to maintain a physical and/or social environment 
in which people can come to faith; surely ordinary laws of nature and people 
operating within them are adequate to do that. And if it is said that they are 
needed to bring about certain particular events (e.g., certain events in the 
lives of particular individuals or a certain state of a society), one must wonder 
why these events are deemed important enough to merit a miraculous inter-
vention by God when other terrible events were allowed to happen (e.g., the 
Holocaust, mass starvations, etc.). It seems implausible to think that events 
of the sort which are said to be practical miracles (healing a particular indi-
vidual or meeting some other need or desire of an individual) are the only or 
best way to prevent greater evils (or promote greater goods) than the evils which 
God has permitted (and it would be strange for God to permit greater evils and 
prevent lesser ones). Of course, the implausibility is relative to what we know 
or have reason to believe, and perhaps we are just too ignorant on such matters 
to be able to reach a conclusion in which we can place any justified confidence. 
So let us consider finally the defense based on our ignorance. 
For the defender of miracles always has this as a fall-back position: God 
chooses people to receive miraculous benefits for reasons known to God and 
not to us humans, or God chooses people arbitrarily because doing so makes 
possible the achieving of some divine goals unknown to us. As I said earlier, 
I know of no way to disprove this suggestion conclusively. But I would ask 
the defender of miracles to consider why she is so sure that miracles have in 
fact occurred. If she cannot give a coherent account of miracles without 
making claims about our ignorance central, perhaps that indicates not the 
limitations on her understanding of God but rather the incorrectness of her 
belief that God has performed miracles. In addition to all the much discussed 
evidential problems involved in justifying the claim that God has performed 
miracles, I have tried to show that there are serious moral problems involved 
in trying to give an empirically plausible account of when and why God has 
performed miracles. If we knew for certain that God had in fact performed 
miracles, then we would have to assume that there is some solution to the 
problems even if we are ignorant of it. But if the claim that God has per-
formed miracles is itself regarded as defeasible, then the problems I have 
raised may make it seem more justified simply to abandon the claim?2 
Wofford College 
NOTES 
1. The nearest terms in the New Testament are "sign," "wonder," and "mighty deed" 
(in Greek, semeia, teras, and dynamis, respectively). Each of these terms refers to an 
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event, often unexpected and/or wonderful, in which God is (believed to be) manifested 
without implying that the event involves a suspension of laws of nature as we understand 
them today. However, some of the events to which they refer, if certain details happened 
as they are described, do seem to have aspects which involve such suspensions. (The 
information about New Testament concepts is taken from Bernard W. Anderson, "Signs 
and Wonders," Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, ed. George Buttrick, et al. [New York: 
Abingdon Press, 1962], Vol. IV, pp. 348-51.) 
2. Since in the New Testament there is no exact equivalent to miracle in our sense of 
the term, some might contend that I should not build into the concept of a miracle the 
requirement that it involve a temporary suspension of some law of nature. But it was not 
I who built it in; that was done by numerous philosophers and theologians in our Western 
tradition. And this requirement is central to the problem I am discussing in this paper: a 
miracle in this sense implies a type of divine activity qualitatively different from the sort 
of divine activity present in most events; I will argue that such activity would constitute 
a kind of unfairness by God. My criticism would not apply if miracle is understood to 
be simply an event which some person takes as manifesting God but in which God does 
not suspend any laws of nature. 
3. Because this moral argument does hinge on the assumption that we should not 
attribute morally problematic qualities to God, it will have no force against those who 
believe that God transcends morality or that God follows moral principles which transcend 
our grasp. I will not try to defend my assumption in this paper, for to do so would take 
me too far afield. I shall, however, note that I think that most of those who believe that 
God performs miracles would agree with my assumption. 
4. I admit that the problem I am raising about miracles is just one aspect of the problem 
of evil for theological determinists and anyone else who would claim that God intends 
everything that happens to every person. For them, miracles raise no special problem. 
However, many theists today would not claim this; I shall argue that for those theists 
miracles pose a distinct problem of evil. 
5. It is clear that the charge of implying that God is unfair in this sense cannot justly 
be leveled at theodicies of the sort mentioned above. For they imply that a person's 
suffering or not suffering evil is the result of the operation of creaturely forces and is not 
specifically intended by God. At certain points in the paper I will indicate in more detail 
the way the unfairness which I am discussing differs from certain other sorts of apparent 
evil which may seem similar. 
6. Of course, the attribution of any of these properties is relative to the beliefs of the 
attributer. If an event did involve a suspension of some law of nature but an observer 
were ignorant of the law and of the sorts of processes which occur in accordance with it, 
she would not recognize that the event involved a suspension of a law of nature and might 
not find the event unexpected. Likewise, if the observer did not see the purpose of the 
event as good, she would not attribute it to God. This is presumably why the Pharisees 
in the New Testament are represented as saying of certain wondrous deeds of Jesus that 
they were done by the power of Beelzebub. 
7. In drawing the distinction this way, I do not wish to imply that there are not any 
inferences involved in the thoughts which lead one to the conclusion that an obvious 
miracle occurred. In particular, there may be inferences involved in arriving at the 
reconstruction of the process which constitutes the event and in arriving at the laws of 
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nature which one accepts. But once these two intellectual tasks have been completed, 
then if there is a logical inconsistency between the statements describing the event and 
those describing some accepted law of nature and if the event is categorized as a miracle 
(rather than, e.g., an occasion to rethink some law of nature), then the event is an obvious 
miracle; if not and the event is categorized as a miracle, then it is an inferred miracle. 
8. Of course, no such inference need be made if one means by miracle simply an 
unexpected event which a person interprets as manifesting God, but which need not 
involve any suspension of a law of nature. But not even an atheist need deny that miracles 
in this sense occur. 
9. I am using this purely as a simple illustration to explicate "taking the initiative;" I 
do not mean to suggest that I think God does or should folio w such a policy. If God were 
to adopt a policy of responding with a miracle to anyone who met a certain condition, the 
condition would presumably involve the religious commitment of the person and probably 
the content of the request etc. 
10. A third possible rejoinder is that moral terms are not applied to God and humans in 
a sufficiently univocal sense to make possible judgments such as that God is unfair. I 
cannot pursue this complex issue, but I will reply that the burden of proof seems to me to 
fall heavily on the one who makes this rejoinder. For 1 take it that Christians have applied 
moral terms to God and have thought it important to believe that God is good (and just 
etc.) in a sense similar to that in which humans are. Even in primary religious material 
such as the Bible, writers wonder how God can be just, and the observations which evoke 
this question are similar to those which would raise this question about humans-4:.g., 
how it can be just for God to permit the good to suffer and the wicked to prosper. This 
issue is raised in many psalms, and why a good man suffers is the question which underlies 
the Book of Job. 
II. The concern expressed abstractly in this paragraph was voiced with far more feeling 
by Lewis B. Smedes, a professor at Ful\cr Seminary: 
My problem was a nagging anxiety 1 felt about touting miraculous healings 
of assorted bearable ailments as signals of God's power and God's desire to 
heal our suffering in a world of chock-ful\ of suffering that never comes close 
to getting healed. It was a feeling 1 could not shake ... a stubborn, uneasy 
feeling about the fittingness, even the decency, of celebrating far and wide 
the miraculous healing of a relatively few ailments within a world endemi-
cally infected by enormous, intractable, unalleviated suffering. It felt to me 
like proclaiming that God is alive and well in the world because you survived 
an airplane crash in which everyone else perished. (The Reformed Journal, 
February 1989, p.14 [the entire article occupies pp. 14-21].) 
Although Smedes' concern seems to focus on the alleged inappropriateness of touting and 
celebrating healings, and mine on the al\eged unfairness of God's healing some and not 
others, it seems to me that the concerns are similar. (1 am indebted to George Mavrodes 
for bringing this article to my attention.) 
12. I will not continue to mention this alternative explicitly, but I intend it to apply in 
the following discussion. 
13. Various important Christian authors have claimed that God causes miracles for this 
purpose. For example, Thomas Aquinas says that God does miracles "for the profit of 
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mankind" in two ways: "one for the confirmation of the truth preached, another to 
demonstrate the holiness of someone whom God wishes to propose to men as an example 
of virtuous living" (Summa Theologiae [New York: McGraw-Hili Book Company], 2a2ae, 
q. 187, art. 2). John Calvin holds that miracles are done in order to confirm the divine 
authority of certain people and the divinity of Christ (Institutes of the Christian Religion, 
ed. John T. McNeill, tr. Ford Lewis Battles [Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1960] T, viii, 
5.). He also says that they are sometimes done to strengthen the faith of some people 
(ibid., IV, xiv, 18). According to Richard Swinburne, one very important reason for 
accepting an alleged prophet as genuine and the prophet's message as a revelation from 
God is that the giving of the message is accompanied by miracles and that the prophet 
accurately predicts events whose occurrence requires a miracle (Faith and Reason [New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1983], pp. 185, 189f.). Though Swinburne does not think 
that these are the only reasons for accepting the prophet and the message, he does think 
them very important in the overall case for such acceptance. (The other reasons are given 
on 183f.) But only the ways which involve miracles could give one reason to think that 
the prophet has knowledge of matters beyond ordinary human ken. The import Swinburne 
gives to miracles is well conveyed by the following quotation: "For another revelation to 
be more probable than the Christian revelation, it would have to be backed by a more 
evident miracle, or be backed by a miracle no less evident but containing more evidently 
true and deep teaching, or perhaps, be backed by a miracle somewhat less evident but 
containing teaching far more evidently true and deep" (pp. I 92f.). Thus, Swinburne does 
suggest that a central purpose for miracles is to rationally certify the occurrence of 
revelation. 
14. It might be suggested that perhaps we could know the immediate purpose of God's 
doing something (e.g., to help someone) but not know God's further purpose (e.g., why 
God helped this person rather than someone else). I shall deal with this suggestion at 
greater length near the end of the paper. Here I will simply note that the only immediate 
purposes in terms of which some event has been seen as a miracle are what I termed 
epistemic or practical. 
IS. The account of miracles given by Thomas Aquinas suggests that they might occur 
at times other than during these revelatory periods, for he says they occur "for the 
confirmation of the truth preached ... [and] to demonstrate the holiness of someone whom 
God wishes to propose to men as an example of virtuous living" (Summa Theologiae, 
2a2ae, q. 187. art. 2). Calvin implies that miracles done to confirm the divine authority 
of people and the divinity of Christ have ceased; he writes: 
It was fitting that the new preaching of the gospel and the new Kingdom of 
Christ should be illumined and magnified by unheard-of and extraordinary 
miracles. When the Lord ceased from these, he did not utterly forsake his 
church, but declared that the magnificence of his Kingdom and the dignity 
of his word had been excellently enough disclosed. (Institutes, IV, xix, 6.) 
I could find no explicit comment on whether miracles done to strengthen the faith of some 
people also have ceased, though Calvin's great stress on the sufficiency of the miracles to 
confirm the revelation that culminated in Christ might suggest that he would think that no 
miracles were needed thereafter for this second purpose. I think that Swinburne's view 
suggests that miracles will occur with greatest frequency in revelatory times, though I do 
not think it implies that they will occur only then. 
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16. I am overlooking events observed by scientists which occasion questions about 
whether the accepted laws of nature are adequate, but which no one is tempted to term 
miracles-e.g., the observation of traces on photographic plates which led to the discovery 
of radioactivity. 
17. If the event were designed so as to be thought a miracle (or candidate event) by 
only a small subset of the observers, then the question of fairness would arise in relation 
to those for whom it is not designed to be seen as a miracle (or candidate event). 
18. It certainly is logically possible that obvious miracles (or at least candidate events) 
occur today if they occurred in the past. They could even be highly public. They could 
occur annually: e.g., each New Year's Day one well-known saintly person who had died 
during the previous year and whose death was very well documented could return to life. 
Or God could cause the same audible message to be heard by every person in the world 
in his or her own native language at the same time and with no detectible source for the 
message. Such public miracles do not occur today. Nor do most people experience more 
private events which are obvious miracles or candidate events. 
19. Alternatively, they could observe miraculous events which made no reference to the 
earlier events but which conveyed to them a content or message equivalent to that of the 
earlier events. This would not confirm the revelatory status of the earlier events, but it 
would be a way of treating them no worse than the eyewitnesses of the earlier events. 
20. The documentation would have to be extremely strong because the events are 
contrary to laws of nature. Even those who believe that miracles occur usually agree that 
stronger documentary evidence is needed to justify belief in their occurrence than would 
be needed for non-miraculous events. 
21. Some evidence to support this can be gained from the texts quoted in note 13. 
22. Examples include Jesus' changing the water into wine (John 2: 1-11) and the raising 
of Lazarus (10hn 11:17-44). 
23. I know of no one who has proposed this theory, but it seems to me to be a possible 
line of response which I want to evaluate. Moreover, a defense for this theory might be 
constructed by reflecting on the fact that some people label as miracles events of the sort 
I termed inferred miracles. It seems that in deciding whar events to label with this term, 
the psychological impact of the event on the observer and the observer's feelings about 
the event play an important role. 
24. Some thinkers might say that no rational grounds are available: the most that can 
be done is to give psychological motivation. 1 would reply that even if that is so, it is 
unfair to provide miracles as a motivation for some and not for others. Suppose it is 
claimed that not only are there no rational grounds for accepting the revelation, but the 
revelation is absurd and faith is the gift of God. If all this is claimed, then it would seem 
that serious consideration would not be a useful way to bring one to accept the revelation 
and that miracles have no epistemic function. Some Christians might hold this position, 
but it falls outside the view under discussion in this paper. I will, however, pose this 
question for those who hold this view: if you believe that God works miracles, with what 
purpose (do you believe) God does this? If an epistemic purpose is rejected, I think it 
will be difficult to identify any plausible purpose other than what 1 have termed practical, 
and we shall see that this latter purpose also has problems. We have also seen that the 
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claim that we humans cannot know the purpose of miracles or that they have no purpose 
raises grave problems for those who want to affirm that miracles have occurred. 
25. It is important to note that I am discussing a view which claims that God does 
sometimes intervene to perform practical miracles. The comments which follow in the 
text would not apply to a view which said that God absolutely never intervenes miracu-
lously, for then there would be no unfairness to anyone. But there would also be no true 
claims that God works miracles. 
26. John Hick (Evil and the God of Love [New York: Harper & Row, 1966)) is one of 
many who have made this claim. 
27. The only possible exception I can think of is a person so thoroughly committed to 
God that maintaining religious ambiguity for her would no longer be important. But few 
people today or at any time meet that criterion, nor do all the events in the Bible which 
seem to be obvious miracles meet it, as I illustrate in the text. 
28. It is hard to see how a defender of the importance of religious ambiguity could admit 
that there could be exceptions. If genuine faith can sometimes be born in non-ambiguous 
contexts, why could it not generally be born in such contexts? 
29. It is true that humans decide to help some and not to help others who are equally 
needy, yet we do not usually call such decisions arbitrary. But humans must make a choice 
because their resources are limited; if they had the resources, they presumably would help 
everyone. God does not face this limitation. God's reason for limiting those whom God 
helps is supposedly the maintenance of a religiously ambiguous context. If that is so 
important, then why should God help anyone? 
30. For this proposal to be viable God must have a detailed knowledge of all possible 
future events and of which ones will become actual if God does certain things. And for 
this to be possible, either compatibiJism must be true or God must have something like 
middle knowledge. I have doubts about both, but I cannot pursue them here. 
31. And if they are said to be necessary for some people to come to faith, then if God 
performs a miracle for them in order to bring them to faith, God is being unfair unless 
God performs a miracle for everyone whom a miracle would bring to faith. The claim 
that God performs a miracle for every such person implies that all persons who do not 
become people of faith would not become people of faith even if God performed a miracle 
for them. And this seems to me highly implausible, despite the statement attributed to 
Abraham in the parable of the rich man and Lazarus (Lk 16:31). 
32. I wish to thank two anonymous referees of this journal for their comments on an 
earlier version of this paper and George Mavrodes for his comments on a still earlier 
version, which was read at the 1990 meeting of the Society for Philosophy of Religion. 
